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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal by a juvenile defendant charged with a 
number of serious crimes challenges the authority of the 
United States government to prosecute him in federal court. 
The governing statute is 18 U.S.C. § 5032, which 
establishes a two-step procedure governing the transfer of 
juveniles from state to federal court for criminal 
prosecution. The appeal presents the important question, 
which has divided the circuits, whether the certification 
decision of the United States Attorney General or her 
designee -- the first-step in the transfer proceedings -- is 
reviewable by a federal court. 
 
Because we believe that the core of the decision to certify 
is one left to the discretion of the federal prosecutor, we 
follow the majority circuit view and hold that we have 
jurisdiction to review only limited aspects of the 
certification decision, including whether the certification is 
proper in form, whether it was made in bad faith, and the 
purely legal question whether the juvenile has been charged 
with a crime of violence. 
 
Our conclusion as to our limited ability to review a 
certification decision effectively resolves the question 
whether the prosecutor made a proper certification here, for 
the non-reviewable facets of the certification (that the Virgin 
Islands refuses to assume jurisdiction and that the case 
presents a substantial federal interest) are sufficient and 
sustain the certification. 
 
                                2 
The second-step question, whether the district court 
properly allowed the transfer of the juvenile to adult status 
under the so-called mandatory transfer provisions of 
§ 5032, turns on whether the possession crime with which 
the juvenile was charged, see V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, 
§ 2251(a)(2), involves a substantial risk of the use of 
physical force. Because the possession crime includes as an 
element of the offense the intent to use a dangerous 
weapon, and the commission of the crime will therefore 
present a substantial risk that physical force will be used, 
we hold that the possession crime satisfies the 
requirements of the § 5032 mandatory transfer provisions. 
The order of the district court transferring the juvenile's 
case to federal court will thus be affirmed. 
 
I. SECTION 5032 TRANSFERS 
 
In order to facilitate the understanding of the issues, we 
first describe the provisions in 18 U.S.C. § 5032 pertaining 
to the transfer of a juvenile from state authorities to a 
federal district court for criminal prosecution as an adult. 
Transfer proceedings are governed by a two-step process. 
The first step is certification by the Attorney General or her 
designee, normally a United States Attorney. The certifying 
party must certify either that 
 
(1) the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a 
State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume 
jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to such 
alleged act of juvenile delinquency, (2) the State does 
not have available programs and services adequate for 
the needs of juveniles, or (3) the offense charged is a 
crime of violence that is a felony or [is] an offense 
[specifically enumerated in this paragraph], and that 
there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or 
the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal 
jurisdiction. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 5032.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We recognize that § 5032 might be read to mean that the certifying 
party must, in all cases, certify that there is a substantial federal 
interest. That reading, although plausible, is a function of inartful 
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Contingent upon a proper certification, the federal 
prosecutor may move in the appropriate district court for a 
transfer of the juvenile to adult status -- the second step in 
the transfer process. Section 5032 envisions two avenues 
by which a transfer may occur. First are the so-called 
permissive transfer provisions. Under the permissive 
transfer provisions, the district court may transfer a 
juvenile "if such court finds, after hearing, such transfer 
would be in the interest of justice." Id. To assess whether 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
drafting of the statute. Following the phrase in the sentence that reads 
"the Attorney General, after investigation, certifies to the appropriate 
district court of the United States that" (emphasis added) there are three 
choices. Separating that phrase and the three choices from the 
substantial federal interest phrase are the words "and that" preceded by 
a comma. Simplifying the sentence, then, it reads as follows: "the 
Attorney General, after investigation, certifies to the appropriate district 
court of the United States that [A, B, or C], and that [D]." (emphasis 
added) The "A, B, or C" represents the phrase containing the three 
choices; the "D" is the phrase containing the substantial federal interest. 
Thus, one might read the statute to require that the Attorney General 
certify everything following the two uses of the word "that," i.e., the 
Attorney General must always certify to the existence of a substantial 
federal interest. 
 
However, this reading does not comport with the legislative history of 
the 1984 amendment to § 5032 that added the language referring to 
crimes of violence and to a substantial federal interest. A Senate report 
stated that the 1984 amendment added a "third category to existing law 
that would permit the disposition of a case involving a juvenile charged 
with a serious felony by means of a Federal proceeding . . . if the 
Attorney General certifies that the offense is a felony crime of violence 
. . . and that there is a `substantial Federal interest in the case or offense 
to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.' " S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 
389 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3529 (footnote 
omitted). Thus, we believe that the proper reading of § 5032 includes the 
substantial federal interest requirement within the third category of 
choices to which the Attorney General must certify. In other words, 
using the same representation as that used above, the certifying party 
must certify to (A), (B), or (C and D). Our reading comports with that of 
the Ninth Circuit, see United States v. Doe, 13 F.3d 302, 304 n.1 (9th 
Cir. 1993), and the Department of Justice, see 3(a) United States 
Department of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual § 9-8.110 
(1988). 
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a transfer would be "in the interest of justice," the statute 
directs the court to examine: 
 
the age and social background of the juvenile; the 
nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of 
the juvenile's prior delinquency record; the juvenile's 
present intellectual development and psychological 
maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and the 
juvenile's response to such efforts; the availability of 
programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral 
problems. 
 
Id. 
 
The second avenue by which a juvenile may be 
transferred to adult status is by way of the mandatory 
transfer provisions. Pursuant to § 5032, a district court 
shall transfer the juvenile if three factors are present: (1) 
the juvenile committed the act underlying the charged 
offense after his sixteenth birthday; (2) the charged offense 
is a felony that has as an element the use of physical force 
or by its nature involves the risk of physical force, or is an 
offense specifically enumerated in the paragraph; and (3) 
the juvenile has previously been found guilty of a crime 
that would satisfy factor (2). Id. 
 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The core offense involves a carjacking. In January 1995, 
a young woman drove to her parents' house to pick up her 
sister. Just after the sister entered the car outside the 
house, two masked men, one of whom was armed, 
approached the car and demanded the keys. The women 
complied and ran back inside the house. Their father then 
went outside, but returned immediately to the house when 
he heard a gun shot. The two men drove off. The police 
located the car the following day; a stereo system and a 
cellular phone had been stolen from the car. 
 
One of the young women named the juvenile as her 
assailant. The Virgin Islands police located the juvenile, 
arrested him, and charged him with robbery, assault, and 
possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime of 
violence. The Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands ordered 
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that the juvenile be prosecuted in that court as an adult. 
Then, pursuant to an agreement with the United States 
Attorney for the Virgin Islands, the Government of the 
Virgin Islands declined to prosecute the juvenile. Shortly 
thereafter, the United States Attorney filed an Information 
in the District Court of the Virgin Islands charging the 
juvenile with carjacking, robbery, use of a firearm during a 
crime of violence, and possession of a firearm during a 
crime of violence. The United States Attorney also made the 
requisite certification under § 5032, and moved under both 
the mandatory and permissive provisions of § 5032 to 
transfer the juvenile to adult status. 
 
The district court held a hearing to determine whether 
transfer to adult status was appropriate. The court 
concluded that all three elements of § 5032's mandatory 
transfer provisions were met: the juvenile was more than 
sixteen years of age when the crime was alleged to have 
been committed; each of the crimes for which he was 
charged had as an element "the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force . . . or . . . involved a 
substantial risk that physical force [may be used] against 
. . . another"; and the juvenile had previously been found 
guilty of a violent crime. The court therefore ordered the 
transfer of the juvenile to adult status. 
 
The juvenile appeals from the district court's transfer 
order. Included in that appeal is a challenge to the § 5032 
certification. We will assume that the § 5032 certification is 
a prerequisite to the district court exercising jurisdiction 
over the transfer hearing. Therefore, whether the district 
court properly exercised jurisdiction over the § 5032 
transfer hearing turns on whether the certification was 
proper. Although the order from which the juvenile appeals 
is not "final" for the purposes of 28 U.S.C.§ 1291 or 48 
U.S.C. § 1613a(c), we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant 
to the collateral order doctrine. See In re A.M., 34 F.3d 153, 
155-56 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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III. REVIEW OF THE PROSECUTOR'S § 5032 
CERTIFICATION 
 
A. Is a § 5032 Certification Reviewable? 
 
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether we 
have jurisdiction to review the prosecutor's § 5032 
certification. Although this is an issue of first impression 
for us, we do not write on a blank slate, for a number of 
Courts of Appeals have already published opinions on the 
point, from which we draw instruction.2  
 
The seminal case is United States v. Vancier, 515 F.2d 
1378 (2d Cir. 1975). In Vancier, the United States Attorney 
had certified to the district court that no appropriate state 
court had jurisdiction over the defendant.3 On appeal, 
Vancier argued that the certification was improper because 
there existed an "appropriate" state court with jurisdiction 
over him. The court noted, however, that § 5032 does not 
explicitly provide for judicial review of a certification, nor 
does it provide articulable standards against which a court 
could measure whether an appropriate state court could 
exercise jurisdiction over the juvenile. See id. at 1380. It 
concluded that, although the statute provides some 
limitations on the prosecutor's discretion to certify a 
juvenile for federal jurisdiction, those limitations do not 
afford the courts the power to review the exercise of that 
discretion. See id. at 1380-81. Analogizing the certification 
decision to other non-reviewable determinations made by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. It is interesting to note that both Houses of Congress are currently 
considering legislation that would amend § 5032 to make clear that the 
necessary certifications are not reviewable by any court. The House of 
Representatives has already passed a version of the legislation, see 
Juvenile Crime Control Act of 1997, H.R. 3, 105th Cong. § 101 (1997), 
and the Senate is actively deliberating about another version, see Violent 
and Repeat Juvenile Offender Act of 1997, S.10, 105th Cong. § 102(a) 
(1997). We understand, of course, that the legislation may change prior 
to enactment, if it is enacted at all. 
 
3. At the time of the Vancier case, § 5032 did not contain the option to 
certify that the juvenile was charged with a crime of violence or with one 
of the enumerated crimes, or the requirement that such a case present 
a substantial federal interest. 
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law enforcement officials, the court held that the§ 5032 
certification is unreviewable. See id. at 1381. 
 
Other circuits have reached a similar conclusion. The 
Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. C.G., 736 F.2d 1474 
(11th Cir. 1984), adopted the reasoning of Vancier and held 
that a court could not review the correctness of a § 5032 
certification asserting that an appropriate state court did 
not have jurisdiction over the juvenile. See id. at 1477-78. 
The Eleventh Circuit suggested, however, that it could 
review a certification to ensure that the certifying party was 
authorized under the statute, that the certification was 
timely filed, and that it stated the appropriate statutory 
factors that give rise to federal jurisdiction. See id. at 1477. 
The court also suggested that it would be appropriate to 
inquire into whether the certification was made in bad 
faith. See id. at 1478; see also United States v. Wellington, 
102 F.3d 499, 503-05 (11th Cir. 1996) (reaffirming the 
holding of C.G.). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held that 
"[w]here . . . a certificate was timely filed, and that 
certificate appeared regular on its face, the trial judge has 
no duty independently to investigate and determine if the 
certificate refers to the proper state court." United States v. 
Gonzalez-Cervantes, 668 F.2d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 
In 1984 Congress amended § 5032, adding the option 
that a prosecutor's certification could include the statement 
that the crime charged was one of violence or was one 
specifically enumerated. In United States v. Juvenile Male, 
923 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1991), the juvenile challenged the 
certification of the charged offense as a crime of violence. 
See id. at 616. The court held that review of a § 5032 
certification that the juvenile was charged with a crime of 
violence was appropriate. The court summarized Vancier 
and C.G. and then concluded that "[n]either of the . . . cases 
persuades us that we cannot review certification here." See 
id. at 617. The Eighth Circuit believed both that it had a 
standard against which to judge the correctness of the 
certification (whether a crime is one of violence is a legal 
question) and that it was merely ensuring that the form of 
the certification was correct (a certification based on the 
type of crime charged must state one of the crimes 
enumerated in the statute (a crime of violence is an 
enumerated crime)). See id. at 617. 
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We do not, however, read the Eighth Circuit as generally 
allowing review of a § 5032 certification, or departing from 
the general principles established in the cases cited above. 
Rather, the holding in Juvenile Male is limited to review of 
whether the crime for which the juvenile was charged was 
actually a crime of violence. The Eighth Circuit's reasoning 
is consistent with the opinions that have not allowed review 
of a § 5032 certification; those opinions focused on different 
aspects of the certification decision, aspects that focused on 
prosecutorial discretion, and the lack of standards guiding 
review of the decision to certify. Such concerns, as the 
Eighth Circuit pointed out, are not implicated by a 
certification that a crime is one of violence, because 
whether a crime is one of violence is determined by 
congressionally created statutory standards. See id. at 
617-18. Our view of Juvenile Male is bolstered by the 
Second Circuit's recent decision in United States v. Doe, 49 
F.3d 859 (2d Cir. 1995). In Doe, the Second Circuit also 
reviewed a § 5032 certification to determine whether the 
crime charged was one of violence. See id. at 866-67.4 
 
The 1984 amendments also added the language requiring 
that the Attorney General or her designee certify "that there 
is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense 
to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. 
§ 5032. Although an argument can be made that this 
language introduced an articulable standard against which 
a court could review certain aspects of certification 
decisions, courts have been unimpressed with that 
contention and have held that this aspect of the 
certification decision, like the other aspects described 
above, is unreviewable. The Eleventh Circuit so held in 
United States v. I.D.P., 102 F.3d 507 (11th Cir. 1996), 
stressing that, although the statute provided a list of 
factors for a court to consider in determining whether to 
grant a motion to transfer, none was a factor by which a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Interestingly, the court cited to Juvenile Male, but did not cite to 
Vancier. We assume that the court did not intend to overrule Vancier; 
therefore, we also assume that the court believed it was acting 
consistently with Vancier. In other words, Doe can be read to mean that 
the Second Circuit allows review of some aspects of a § 5032 
certification, but not others, the very conclusion we reach here. 
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court could meaningfully determine whether there existed a 
substantial federal interest. See id. at 511. 
 
The court further reasoned that the determination 
whether a particular case presented a substantial federal 
interest was an administrative decision that turned on law 
enforcement considerations such as the general incidence 
of crime, the need for deterrence, enforcement priorities, 
and the like. See id. at 511-12. Such decisions, it noted, 
are best left to the prosecutors. Finally, the court examined 
the legislative history of the 1984 amendment, and 
concluded that this history suggested that Congress 
intended the decision whether there existed a substantial 
federal interest to be left to the discretion of the Attorney 
General, qualified by a number of limiting factors not 
contained in the statute itself. See id. at 512-13. 
 
The only case finding a certification of a substantial 
federal interest to be reviewable is United States v. Juvenile 
Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314 (4th Cir. 1996). In Juvenile Male #1, 
the juvenile had moved to dismiss the case against him in 
federal court on the grounds that the § 5032 certification 
was improper because the case did not present a 
substantial federal interest, and the district court denied 
his motion. The appeals court began by examining whether 
the district court had jurisdiction to review a § 5032 
certification at all.5 It first noted that the lack of a specific 
provision calling for judicial review does not bar review, and 
asserted that there is a strong presumption that Congress 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The court stated that "[i]t should be beyond serious argument that the 
courts should review compliance with the essentially technical 
requirements of § 5032, such as the proper certifying party, timeliness of 
the certification, inclusion of the statutory language, or the age of the 
juvenile." See Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d at 1319 (citations omitted). We 
agree, and would add that we may review whether the certification was 
made in bad faith. We note that the appellant here does not challenge 
the § 5032 certification for technical defects. There is no suggestion that 
the form of the certification is incorrect (for example, whether a 
prosecutor certified that the juvenile is charged with a crime not 
enumerated in the statute), that the certification was untimely filed, that 
an improper official made the certification, or that it was made in bad 
faith or for an improper purpose. Nor does evidence of such appear in 
the record. 
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intends judicial review. See id. at 1319-20. And, the court 
continued, it could find nothing in the statute that 
overcomes this strong presumption in favor of reviewability. 
See id. at 1320. The court concluded its brief discussion by 
noting that it would give primary attention to the needs of 
rehabilitation in construing the juvenile statutes. See id. In 
reaching its conclusion, the court relied on Gutierrez de 
Martinez v. Lamagno, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 2227 (1995), 
a case from which the concurrence also draws significant 
support, for the proposition that executive determinations 
are generally subject to judicial review. See Juvenile Male 
#1, 86 F.3d at 1319. 
 
Chief Judge Wilkinson, in his concurring opinion, 
reached the conclusion that such certifications are 
unreviewable. Judge Wilkinson began by noting that the 
statute contains no provision explicitly allowing for judicial 
review of § 5032 certifications, though it does provide for 
judicial review of the second step -- the motion to transfer 
the juvenile. See United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d 
1314, 1324 (4th Cir. 1996) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring). 
More importantly, he stressed that the statute does not set 
out standards by which a court is to review the 
certification, whereas, in contrast, the statute includes a 
list of factors a court is to consider when determining 
whether the motion to transfer the juvenile is appropriate. 
See id. at 1324-25.6 This lack of guidance suggested to 
Judge Wilkinson that Congress intended the determination 
whether to issue a certification to be left to the discretion 
of the Attorney General, limited only by the requirement 
that the case present a substantial federal interest. See id. 
at 1325. 
 
Whether a case presents a substantial federal interest, 
Judge Wilkinson continued, turns on policy-based 
determinations of law enforcement priorities that are best 
left to the prosecutors. See id. Judge Wilkinson feared that 
allowing courts to review § 5032 certification decisions 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. For permissive transfers, these factors include the six aspects of the 
"interest of justice" standard; for mandatory transfers, these factors 
include the age of the juvenile, the type of offense for which he has been 
charged, and his past criminal record. See supra at part I. 
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would engender interbranch conflict as courts would 
second-guess decisions decidedly executive (not judicial) in 
nature. See id. at 1325-26. Judge Wilkinson compared the 
§ 5032 certification decision to other, similar prosecutorial 
decisions that have traditionally been unreviewable. See id. 
at 1326. Finally, Judge Wilkinson distinguished Gutierrez 
de Martinez. He noted that in Gutierrez de Martinez the 
certification at issue was " `dispositive of a court 
controversy.' " Id. at 1326 n.2 (quoting Gutierrez de 
Martinez, 115 S. Ct. at 2231).7 In such circumstances, 
judicial review is expected. However, § 5032 certifications, 
Judge Wilkinson notes, are not dispositive of the 
controversy. See id. In other words, a § 5032 certification 
does not prevent judicial review of all aspects of the 
relevant case. The concerns animating the Court in 
Gutierrez de Martinez, then, do not apply in§ 5032 
certifications. 
 
We agree with Judge Wilkinson's reasoning and 
observations, adding a few comments about the federalism 
concerns implicated by § 5032 certifications upon which the 
concurring opinion relies. Whether a case presents a 
substantial federal interest does, of course, implicate 
federalism concerns. Such concerns, rooted in the debate 
over the proper relationship between the states and the 
federal government, are different in kind from law 
enforcement considerations. Concerns over law enforcement 
are best left to the discretion of prosecutors closest to these 
problems. Concerns over federalism, in contrast, might 
seem more properly considered by the courts. That review 
in contexts such as that presented here, however, depends 
on adequate statutory standards, and those standards are 
lacking. Even if they were present, the other factors 
weighing against judicial review of a certification of 
substantial federal interest (mentioned during our 
summary of the case law in the area) clearly prevail. 
 
The concurring opinion observes that the federal courts 
are experienced in making judgments as to matters such as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Judge Wilkinson also noted that the Attorney General had argued in 
favor of judicial review. See Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d at 1326 n.2 
(Wilkinson, C.J., concurring). 
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what constitutes a substantial federal interest. We do not 
know specifically what the concurrence has in mind, but we 
know of no satisfactory formula for making such judgments 
within the framework of our jurisprudence.8 At all events, 
the exercise at issue here is more akin to policy making. 
 
The remaining rationale of the concurring opinion strikes 
us as somewhat ephemeral. It suggests that Congress 
added the substantial federal interest requirement with the 
intent of reminding federal prosecutors of the strong 
interest the states have in juvenile justice. It also draws 
support from the fact that the decision to certify has been 
delegated to local United States Attorneys who may be 
subject to parochial concerns, thereby lessening their 
concern with the interests of federalism. These reasons 
seem speculative to us, and do not, in our view, reveal a 
congressional intent that the substantial federal interest 
certification be subject to judicial review. At all events, the 
arguments do not countervail the forceful contentions 
marshaled by our sister circuits in the opinions we have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The concurring opinion points to language in the legislative history of 
the 1984 amendments and suggests that such language provides some 
guidance as to what constitutes a substantial federal interest. That 
language, however, only provides examples. And, unfortunately, those 
examples are, for the most part, crimes that make up only a minuscule 
fraction of total federal crime, e.g., assaults on federal officials, hijacking, 
kidnaping, major espionage, and significant destruction of federal 
property. The only example given in the legislative history that deals with 
frequently occurring crimes is large-scale drug trafficking. It is 
interesting to note in this regard that federal courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction with the state courts over drug crimes, and the decision 
whether to prosecute drug crimes in the federal courts is generally left 
to the discretion of federal prosecutors. 
 
As an example of the difficulty presented by endeavoring to define 
standards against which phrases such as "substantial federal interest" 
can be measured, we suggest examining the Judicial Conference's 
attempts to draw the contours of the kinds of cases that ought to 
command the attention of federal courts. Despite the years of effort that 
went into its drafting, the Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts 
ultimately adopted provisions that are quite broad, and scarcely provide 
the calipers for making the kind of determination for which the 
concurrence would call. See Judicial Conference of the United States, 
Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts 22-30 (1995). 
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summarized (and, in large measure, endorsed). The 
concurrence also notes that there must be a "finding" of a 
substantial federal interest, and reasons that this suggests 
judicial determination. We find this argument 
unpersuasive. 
 
We follow Judge Wilkinson's lead and that of Vancier and 
its progeny discussed above, and hold that, while we have 
jurisdiction to review a § 5032 certification only for 
technical defects, for whether a crime is one of violence, 
and for whether the certification was made in bad faith or 
for improper purposes, we have no jurisdiction to review 
the other aspects of a § 5032 certification, namely whether 
a state court will assume jurisdiction, whether the state 
has adequate programs for juveniles, and whether there is 
a substantial federal interest.9 
 
B. Was the Certification Proper? 
 
Having determined the extent of reviewability, we turn to 
the question whether the United States Attorney's § 5032 
certification was proper. The United States Attorney 
certified that the Virgin Islands had refused to exercise 
jurisdiction over the prosecution of the case, that the 
crimes for which the juvenile was charged were ones of 
violence, and that the case presented a substantial federal 
interest. The juvenile argues that the certification was 
improper for two reasons. First, he claims that one of the 
crimes for which he was charged, possession of a firearm, 
is not a crime of violence.10 Second, he contends that the 
case does not present a substantial federal interest. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In our discussion, we have summarized precedent from other circuits 
addressing the reviewability of certifications based on the type of crime 
charged and based upon the lack of or refusal to assume jurisdiction 
over the juvenile by a state court. We are unaware of any court decision 
addressing a certification based upon the availability of services for the 
juvenile. It would appear, however, that such certifications should not be 
subject to review for the same reasons that we do not review whether 
there is a state court that will assume jurisdiction over the prosecution 
of the case, i.e., the lack of statutory standards and the similarity of the 
determination to unreviewable executive decisions. 
 
10. The juvenile was also charged with crimes that are indisputably 
crimes of violence. The juvenile is effectively arguing that the existence 
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Under § 5032, the federal prosecutor need only certify to 
one of the following: (1) that there is no appropriate state 
court to exercise jurisdiction over the juvenile; (2) that the 
state has inadequate programs to address juvenile 
delinquency; or (3) that the crime charged was a crime of 
violence or was enumerated in the statute, and there was 
a substantial federal interest sufficient to warrant the 
exercise of jurisdiction. Because the federal prosecutor here 
certified that no state court would exercise jurisdiction over 
the prosecution of the juvenile, which as we have explained 
is non-reviewable, there is no need also to certify that the 
juvenile has been charged with a crime of violence, and that 
there existed a substantial federal interest. We need not, 
therefore, discuss whether the challenged crime is one of 
violence or whether a substantial federal interest is present. 
 
In short, the federal prosecutor has fulfilled the statutory 
requirements of certification in such a manner so as to 
effectively insulate the certification from our review. 
 
IV. MANDATORY TRANSFER UNDER § 5032 
 
We turn finally to the second step in the § 5032 exercise 
-- the question of the correctness of the district court's 
order transferring the juvenile to adult status. Our 
standard for reviewing such an order is not clear. We have 
previously stated that we review the district court's decision 
to transfer under the § 5032 permissive transfer provisions 
for abuse of discretion. See United States v. A.R., 38 F.3d 
699, 702 (3d Cir. 1994). Here, however, the district court 
approved the transfer of the juvenile to federal district court 
under the so-called mandatory transfer provisions of 
§ 5032. Because the § 5032 mandatory transfer provisions 
require the district court to order a transfer given certain 
factual and legal predicates, we believe an abuse of 
discretion standard is inappropriate. Rather, we will subject 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
of one non-violent crime amidst a slew of violent crimes renders the 
certification improper, at least with respect to that one non-violent crime 
but possibly to all the charged crimes. We need not reach this question, 
however, because, as we will make clear in the text, the possession crime 
is clearly one of violence. 
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the district court's legal conclusions to plenary review and 
its factual findings to clearly erroneous review. 
 
Under the mandatory transfer provisions, and contingent 
on a proper certification, a juvenile's case must be 
transferred to federal district court if three factors are 
present. First, the juvenile must have committed the act in 
question after his sixteenth birthday. Second, the charged 
offense must be a felony that either "[(1)] has as an element 
thereof the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person of another, or[(2)] by its 
very nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force 
against the person of another may be used in committing 
the offense," or is one that has been enumerated in the 
statute. Third, the juvenile must previously have been 
convicted of a crime that satisfies the second factor. 
 
The juvenile does not challenge the district court's 
findings as to the first and third factors (he committed the 
act in question while he was seventeen years old, and he 
has previously been found guilty of robbery in thefirst 
degree). We see no reason to question them. Turning to the 
second factor, the juvenile was charged with violating 
§ 2251(a)(2), which prohibits the possession of dangerous 
weapons; Section 2251(a)(2) is a felony because it is 
punishable by a term of imprisonment greater than one 
year. See 18 U.S.C. § 1(1) (defining felony as "[a]ny offense 
punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year"). The juvenile nonetheless contends that the 
possession crime for which he was charged still does not 
satisfy the second factor in the § 5032 mandatory transfer 
provisions.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The juvenile's argument assumes that for the purposes of § 5032 we 
may look only to the conduct alleged in the possession count to 
determine whether § 2251(a)(2) satisfies the requirements of the second 
part of the second factor of the § 5032 mandatory transfer provisions. In 
other words, the juvenile seems to assume that § 5032 requires a 
categorical approach, rather than a fact-specific approach, to 
determining whether a particular crime satisfies the § 5032 
requirements. That assumption draws support from our discussion of 
the definition of a crime of violence in the Sentencing Guidelines. See 
United States v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 844, 850-56 (3d Cir. 1992). In Joshua, 
 
                                16 
The crime challenged by the juvenile punishes those who, 
"with intent to use the same unlawfully against another, 
has, possesses, bears, transports, carries or has under his 
proximate control, a dagger, dirk, dangerous knife, razor, 
stiletto, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon." V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2251(a)(2) (emphasis added). Clearly, 
§ 2251(a)(2) does not satisfy the requirements of the first 
part of the second factor, because no element of 
§ 2251(a)(2) involves the "use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force." However, just as clearly, § 2251(a)(2) 
satisfies the requirements of the second part of the second 
factor, which requires that the charged offense by its very 
nature involves a "substantial risk that physical force . . . 
may be used" during the commission of the crime. 12 Section 
§ 2251(a)(2) includes as an element the intent to use a 
dangerous weapon. Certainly, if someone intends to use a 
dangerous weapon then there is "substantial risk that 
physical force . . . may be used." Therefore, § 2251(a)(2) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
we held that "a sentencing court should look solely to the conduct 
alleged in the count of the indictment charging the offense of conviction 
in order to determine whether that offense is a crime of violence" 
because it creates a risk of the use of physical force. Id. at 856. In our 
discussion, we assume, though do not hold, that we may not look 
beyond the possession count to determine if the requirements of § 5032 
are met. If we were to consider the charged conduct beyond the 
possession count, the requirements of § 5032 would surely be met; the 
juvenile brandished the weapon, pointed it at one of the victims, and, at 
some point, fired it, thereby creating a substantial risk of the use of 
physical force. 
 
12. Our conclusion that § 2251(a)(2) is a crime of violence is supported 
by analogy to 18 U.S.C. § 16. The phrase crime of violence, though not 
defined in § 5032, is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 16. The language of the 
second factor of the § 5032 mandatory transfer provisions tracks the 
language of § 16 in all relevant respects. Under § 16, a crime of violence 
means either "(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical force . . . or (b) any other offense that 
is a felony and that, by its nature, involves substantial risk that physical 
force against the person or property of another may be used in the 
course of committing the offense." Section 2251(a)(2) satisfies the 
requirements of § 16(b), just as it satisfied the requirements of the 
second part of the second factor of the § 5032 mandatory transfer 
provisions. 
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satisfies the second factor of the § 5032 mandatory transfer 
provisions.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Experience with the career offender provisions of the Sentencing 
Guidelines is instructive in interpreting § 2251(a)(2). To qualify as a 
career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines, an offender, inter alia, 
must have been convicted of two previous felony crimes of violence or 
felony crimes involving controlled substances. See 1995 U.S.S.G. 
§ 4B1.1. Pursuant to the Guidelines, a crime that "involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another" is a crime 
of violence. See id. § 4B1.2(1)(ii). Prior to the amendment, this definition 
generated controversy when applied to the felon-in-possession of a 
firearm crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Under § 922(g)(1), it is a crime 
for a person who has previously been convicted of a felony merely to 
possess a firearm. See id. "[A] substantial body of Circuit precedent" held 
that a felon-in-possession crime constituted a crime of violence under 
the Guidelines. Stinson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 
1916 & n.1 (1993). 
 
Typical of the reasoning holding that a felon-in-possession crime is 
categorically a crime of violence is the discussion in United States v. 
O'Neal, 910 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1990). In O'Neal, the court reasoned that 
an armed felon, without more, poses a substantial threat of the use of 
physical force. See id. at 667. In other words, mere possession of a 
weapon by a felon is enough, because by past deeds that felon has 
shown the willingness to engage in criminal activity and this willingness 
may now include the use of the weapon he possesses. See id.; see also 
United States v. Stinson, 943 F.2d 1268, 1271-73 (11th Cir. 1991), 
vacated on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 1913 (1993). In contrast, we had 
held that mere possession, without more, by a felon was not a crime of 
violence under the pre-amendment career offender guidelines. See United 
States v. Williams, 892 F.2d 296, 304 (3d Cir. 1989) Because of cases 
like O'Neal, the Sentencing Commission amended the Application Notes 
to § 4B1.2 specifically to exclude the felon-in-possession crime from the 
definition of crime of violence for purposes of the career offender 
guidelines. See 1992 U.S.S.G., App. C, Amend. 461. 
 
The felon-in-possession crime cases are instructive here because they 
rely on the reasoning that mere possession may imply intent to use. The 
intent to use, in turn, creates the substantial risk of the use of physical 
force. The amendment to the Guidelines eliminated the inferential leap 
courts had been taking in interpreting § 922(g)(1); in other words, the 
Sentencing Commission made it impermissible for a court to infer for the 
purposes of the career offender guidelines that the status of being a felon 
in possession of a weapon implied that the felon intended to use the 
weapon. The amendment did not, however, affect the reasoning that the 
intent to use a weapon created a substantial risk of the use of physical 
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Because we believe the district court did not err in 
finding that each of the three mandatory transfer provision 
factors were present in this case, we hold that the court 
properly transferred the juvenile to federal court for 
criminal prosecutions. 
 
The order of the district court will be affirmed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
force. At least a part of the reasoning of the felon-in-possession crime 
cases survives, the part we rely on here. 
 
At all events, § 2251(a)(2) includes as an element the intent to use the 
weapon the individual possesses. (Section 922(g)(1) does not include 
intent as an element.) Section 2251(a)(2), then, requires proof of the very 
element that courts interpreting § 922(g)(1) had been inferring. With 
proof that a defendant intends to use the weapon he possesses, a court 
can look to the felon-in-possession crime cases to reason that such a 
defendant poses a substantial risk of the use of physical force. We do so 
here. 
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WEIS, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I. 
 
Analysis of the scope of judicial review of the 
government's certification under the Juvenile Delinquency 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5032, must begin with the following 
statement from the Supreme Court: "[W]e have stated time 
and again that judicial review of executive action`will not 
be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that 
such was the purpose of Congress.' " Gutierrez de Martinez 
v. Lamagno, 115 S.Ct. 2227, 2231 (1995) (quoting Abbott 
Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)). Conceding 
that the statute under consideration in that case was 
susceptible to divergent interpretations, the Court adopted 
a construction consistent with "traditional understandings 
and basic principles: that executive determinations 
generally are subject to judicial review and that mechanical 
judgments are not the kind federal courts are set up to 
render." Id. at 2236. 
 
Using Lamagno as a guide, the question is whether there 
is "persuasive reason" to believe that Congress intended to 
limit the scope of judicial review of section 5032 
certifications to technical compliance and prosecutorial bad 
faith. Not only do careful studies of the statutory language 
and its legislative history fail to reveal a convincing ground 
to limit judicial review, they also disclose Congress' deep 
concern for principles of federalism that might be 
jeopardized by overzealous federal prosecution. 
 
The 1984 amendments to section 5032 expanded the 
bases for transferring a case from state to federal 
jurisdiction. If the felony offense is a "crime of violence" or 
one of those offenses specifically described in the 
amendments, and "there is a substantial Federal interest in 
the case or the offense," the prosecution may proceed in the 
federal courts. 
 
The Senate Report that accompanied the amendments 
acknowledged that the traditional policy of state 
predominance in this area survived. Explaining the narrow, 
federal inroad into state jurisdiction over juvenile 
delinquency proceedings, the Senate Committee stated: 
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The essential concepts of the 1974 Act are that juvenile 
delinquency matters should generally be handled by 
the States and that criminal prosecution of juvenile 
offenders should be reserved for only those cases 
involving particularly serious conduct by older 
juveniles. The Committee continues to endorse these 
concepts, but has determined that certain 
modifications in current law are necessary to allow an 
adequate Federal response to serious criminal conduct 
on the part of juveniles. 
 
S.Rep. 98-225 at 386 (1984) reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182, 3526. 
 
The Committee also cautioned that "a determination that 
there is a `substantial Federal interest' " be grounded on a 
"finding" that 
 
the nature of the offense or the circumstances of the 
case give rise to special Federal concerns. Examples of 
such cases could include an assault on, or 
assassination of, a federal official, an aircraft hijacking, 
a kidnaping where State boundaries are crossed, a 
major espionage or sabotage offense, participation in 
large-scale drug trafficking, or significant and willful 
destruction of property belonging to the United States. 
 
Id. at 389 reprinted in id. at 3529. 
 
By requiring a certification by the Attorney General, 
Congress emphasized that the decision to place a juvenile 
case within federal jurisdiction must be neither casual nor 
routine, but should be carefully considered. The existence 
of this restraint is in sharp contrast to the typical adult 
criminal case in which a federal prosecutor may choose to 
indict for a federal crime even when the underlying conduct 
may also violate state law. In such a situation, of course, 
the prosecutor enjoys wide discretion that, significantly, is 
unfettered by a certification requirement. 
 
Rather than extend such unlimited discretion to the 
prosecutor's decision to initiate juvenile proceedings in 
federal court, Congress included the certification 
requirement to remind federal prosecutors of the strong 
interests that states have in juvenile justice. That 
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consideration leads to the related inference that, rather 
than being adverse to judicial review, Congress approves it 
as a method of enforcing its policy in favor of state primacy 
in juvenile delinquency proceedings. 
 
Additional support for this view is supplied by the 
Committee's assertion that the determination of a 
"substantial federal interest" be based on a "finding" of 
special federal concerns. Use of the term "finding" 
reasonably implies that a judicial proceeding was 
contemplated. 
 
Finally, we should not discount the significance of 28 
C.F.R. § 0.57 (1996), through which the Attorney General 
has delegated to the United States Attorney in the 
appropriate district the authority to provide the requisite 
certification. The certification process, therefore, is not 
administered at the national level, but is applied in a local 
context where parochial concerns become more influential. 
 
Federal courts manage caseloads that are far more 
diverse than those of local federal prosecutors and, as a 
result, have a greater familiarity with the complexities of 
federalism. Given the experience of the federal bench in 
questions of federal-state relations, it would be expected 
that Congress would vest oversight of these important 
procedures in the judiciary rather than in the local United 
States Attorney. At the very least, that inference should 
govern absent a clear indication to the contrary from 
Congress. 
 
The strong language in Lamagno favoring judicial review 
differs dramatically from the view taken by the Courts of 
Appeals in United States v. Vancier, 515 F.2d 1378 (2d Cir. 
1975), and to a lesser extent, United States v. C.G., 736 
F.2d 1474 (11th Cir. 1984). Those opinions take a 
restrictive approach to judicial review of certifications under 
18 U.S.C. § 5032. Both pre-dated Lamagno and, 
consequently, their persuasive value has been substantially 
undermined. In addition, the "substantial federal interest" 
qualification, which was added to the Juvenile Delinquency 
Act in 1984, also post-dates those two cases. 
 
In United States v. I. D. P., 102 F.3d 507, 511-13 (11th 
Cir. 1996), the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
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chose to follow C.G., and to distinguish Lamagno, in 
holding that the courts may not review certifications to 
determine the existence of a substantial federal interest. In 
its review of the legislative history, I.D.P. observed that the 
Senate Report referred to a predecessor bill that set forth 
standards for the Attorney General to follow. The Court, 
however, did not discuss the fact that the earlier bill 
contained a provision barring judicial review of 
certifications -- a provision that eventually was removed. In 
my view, the deliberate deletion of that prohibition not only 
shows that Congress knew how to ban review if it wished 
but also that it had rejected the proposal. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit took a 
different approach than I.D.P. in United States v. Juvenile 
Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314 (4th Cir. 1996) when it relied upon 
the traditional congressional preference for having juvenile 
matters handled in state courts, even though federal 
jurisdiction had been expanded in the 1984 amendments to 
the Juvenile Delinquency Act. Viewing the legislative history 
as inconsistent with the grant of unreviewable discretion to 
the prosecutor, Juvenile Male #1 held that the strong 
presumption in favor of judicial review so forcefully 
reiterated in Lamagno must prevail. Id. at 1321. Although 
the Juvenile Male #1 Court did not use the term 
"federalism," that consideration was at the core of its 
reasoning. 
 
Those Courts that deny review of the certification process 
except for technical compliance and bad faith cite the lack 
of standards in the statutory language for substantive 
review. See C.G., 736 F.2d at 1478; Vancier, 515 F.2d at 
1380. This reasoning is somewhat puzzling. It implies that 
the United States Attorneys will be able to apply the statute 
despite the absence of standards, but that the courts are 
unable to cope with the task of review in similar 
circumstances. If the federal prosecutors had the same 
broad discretion as they do when adult prosecutions are 
contemplated, that rationale might be justified. But, as 
noted earlier, Congress made it clear that the federal 
prosecutor's authority in the juvenile delinquency setting 
remains limited. Moreover, judicial deference is especially 
questionable here because at stake are issues of federalism 
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and the limitations of federal prosecutorial authority -- 
areas in which Congress reasonably could expect the 
courts' perspective to be more objective than that of the 
United States Attorneys. 
 
The legislative history of the 1984 amendments, which 
explicitly stated that "the Federal Government will continue 
to defer to State authorities for less serious juvenile 
offenses," addresses this concern. The Senate Report cited 
certain examples of offenses raising special federal 
interests. Although Congress did not repeat these 
standards in the statute itself, they are helpful guideposts, 
and there is no indication that Congress intended them to 
inform the prosecutor's decision, but not the court's. 
 
Finally, the search for a substantial federal interest 
cannot be any more difficult than, for example, "the judicial 
struggle to interpret the Commerce Clause during the 
transition from the economic system the Founders knew to 
the single, national market still emergent in our own era." 
United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Whether the interpretative 
question is constitutional or statutory, the judiciary must 
provide an answer no matter how nebulous the standard. I 
believe that the federal courts have both the competence 
and the duty to review the certifications in section 5032 
and that we should undertake that task in this case. 
 
II. 
 
I agree with the majority that the dispositive issue in this 
case is whether it was properly transferred under clause (1) 
of § 5032 because the Territorial Government had 
relinquished jurisdiction. To arrive at its conclusion, the 
majority says it is bound to accept the certification's 
statement to that effect because it is unreviewable. 
 
Rather than simply accept the United States Attorney's 
certification on its face, I have reviewed the record and 
found that it provides undisputed evidence that the 
Attorney General of the Virgin Islands abandoned its 
prosecution of the juvenile and so informed the United 
States Attorney. I perceive no difference between a state's 
refusal to assume jurisdiction from the outset, see United 
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States v. Hill, 538 F.2d 1072, 1077 (4th Cir. 1976), and a 
state's agreement to relinquish jurisdiction after charges 
have been filed. Neither situation presents a conflict of the 
sovereigns' interests. When the state agrees to step aside, 
federalism concerns fade into the background. The 
certification therefore withstands review. 
 
In addition, I fully agree with the majority's opinion that, 
after assuming jurisdiction, the district court properly 
invoked the mandatory transfer provision of section 5032 
for treating defendant as an adult. 
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